




The Anthropology of Business Ethics: Worth 
Thinking about!  







This article deals with epistemological thoughts about business ethics. My 
intention is to consider business ethics as a research subject in 
anthropology and not to judge the relevance of the morality or ethics: in 
other words, the integration of activities in a “common good” category. 
The article examines the philosophical ground of this notion and explores 
whether business ethics is related to this philosophical background. 
While, from an anthropological point of view, it is better to draw a value 
judgment from the notion of “business ethics” (applicability, truthfulness, 
intentionality, and so on), the argument presented here is that it is better 
to consider “business ethics” as a category of work management at the 
meeting point between theory and practice, and to observe in situ how 
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It might be assumed that anthropology is inherently wary of ethics and 
morality and is inclined to avoid it in the name of cultural relativism.1 As a 
matter of fact, the issue of the ethics or morality of anthropology has been 
around since the discipline emerged, although not addressed in the same 
terms as today. The work put together by Pat Caplan―even though it 
dates back a decade―draws a picture of discussions and dilemmas 
around ethics in anthropology and asks the question: “What is 
anthropology for? Who is it for?” (2003: 3) and re-examines the 
relationships between the discipline and ethics since the 1960s (ibid.: 1-
27). Moreover, a rejection of anthropology and the knowledge of 
anthropologists being used for espionage or military purposes has 
marked the history of the discipline from Franz Boas (1919) to Marshall 
Sahlins (2007; 2013). More recently, an attempt to create a new field, 
named― depending on its authors―an “ethnography of moralities” 
(Howell 1997), “moral anthropology” (Fassin 2008), “anthropology of 
moralities” (Zigon 2008) and anthropology of ethics (Massé 2009; 
Faubion 2011), seems to transcend the question of relationships between 
anthropology and the legitimacy of its practice. 
May Edel and Abraham Edel (2000 1968) have opened a dialogue 
between philosophy and anthropology in an interdisciplinary approach 
and concluded, unsurprisingly, that both disciplines have benefitted 
symbiotically from one another, thus enabling an exploration both of how 
the theory of ethics is redefined when its cultural content becomes 
obvious and of the relations between morality and cultural schemes.  
Today, ethics is an expression of the relationship with “what is 
happening.” Ethics refers to the practice of regulating and shaping our 
comment on historical, technical and scientific, social or media situations. 
This norm regarding comments and opinions is embodied by institutions 
with their own authority such as the “national ethical commissions” 
appointed by the State (Badiou 2003: 20). We are also witnessing an 
inflation of ethics (Canto-Sperber 2006) to such an extent that they are 
found, as if fragmented, in several fields, so that there are now an ethics of 
the workplace, business ethics, medical ethics, space ethics, and so on 
(see Marzano 2008). Parallel to this fragmentation of ethics into 
specialized domains, we are witnessing the emergence of a new 
professional category in the social division of work, whose 
representatives call themselves “ethicists” to distinguish themselves from 
thinkers of moral philosophy; these are “practitioners” of ethics (Canto-
Sperber and Ogien 2006: 14). 
                                                        
1 This article is a revised version of a paper published in the review Moussons, 2013, n° 21, 
21-36. 
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Naturally, business ethics must consider the phenomenon of the 
social inflation of ethics in the world of work, especially as ethics and 
anthropology deal with similar issues and concerns. Not wishing to make 
morality or ethics my central subject of study (Fassin 2008), which would 
mean having “the ambition of making explicit and intelligible the 
evaluative principles and practices in different societies and contexts, of 
analysing and interpreting the way social agents form, justify and apply 
their judgements about good and evil” (Fassin and Stoczkowski 2008: 
331), I wish to deal with the notion of “business ethics” in its emic 
meaning, as it is used by actors within the corporate world. 
Business ethics can be understood as the construction of norms and 
values that have been made clear, that meet social demand, and that are 
used to formalise the principles of collective work (Cardot 2006). 
However, such a definition brings the notion of “business ethics” closer to 
that of “corporate culture.” Both notions refer to moral rules spelt out by 
the leaders of a company to legitimise work management and establish 
their corporate image (Cuche 2004: 99). I do not consider business ethics 
as simply the laying out and carrying out of these values. Business ethics 
is not simply a set of guidelines and ethical codes. It is also about how 
these values are received, embraced, manipulated, utilized, or evaded by 
participants in a specific business organization, be they managers, 
employees, contractors, or customers. 
Research carried out so far, mainly in the fields of management or 
applied ethics, takes into account the moral aspect of companies in the 
normative sense: is the subject of these works “actually” moral or are 
their practices morally acceptable? How can production be moralised? 
However, these studies do not really look into “business ethics” as such: 
in other words, when a company displays, promotes and codifies values 
as if they were an object of its own. Hence, Browne and Milgram (2009) 
explore the moral part of economy in the companies they have observed. 
Others have attempted to tackle the moral side of the economy (Browne 
2009: 1) or the concept of moral economy, as defined by Andrew Sayer 
(2005). 
In this article, then, I shall explore the notions of morality, ethics 
and business ethics. The last should not be automatically understood as a 
category of analysis, for it is related to discourse and used as a managing 
tool by businessmen or managers. Thus, business ethics encounters an 
increasing social demand for responsibility from companies, which 
should act as role models for society and make their inner workings more 
humane. However, without judging the relevance of morality or ethics 
within companies, I will explore the conditions that can make business 
ethics possible while avoiding, in the debate on ethics, the normative 
question of their application. 
My suggestion is that we go back to the philosophical roots of the 
notion. To do this, I will first examine the concept as defined by the 




philosophers of business ethics, which will lead me to present a program 
for an anthropological reading of such ethics. My point is neither to speak 
as a moralist nor to perform a moral evaluation of the corporate world. 
Naturally, organizational anthropology must deal with the social 
phenomenon of the increasing importance of ethics in the world of work, 
even more so because moral philosophy through ethics and anthropology 
share similar issues. I shall focus on “business ethics” as a subject by 
looking at its historical background and its social uses. 
 
Philosophy versus anthropology 
The word “ethics” comes from the Greek for “to inhabit” or “to inhabit the 
world,” or ethos: habits, customs, in the general sense of behaviour. For 
the Greeks, it refers to a form of knowledge as to how to behave. Morality 
is a word of Latin origin, from Latin mos (or mores in the plural) and also 
means “customs.” Morality is indeed the classical Latin translation of 
what the Greeks call “ethics.” Clearly, ethics and morality both deal with 
the definition and description of the categories of good and evil translated 
into values, but also into individual behaviour. For most authors, both 
words seem to be used as synonyms. However, a difference gradually 
appeared in the use of both terms. In more recent times, it has often been 
considered that the term “morality” should be reserved for values 
inherited from the past and tradition, or from religion. “Morality more or 
less evolved into ‘what is transmitted,’ becoming a code of behaviours 
that were already more or less set” (Droit 2009: 19). Today, however, the 
term “ethics” is more widely used in fields in which norms and such 
behaviours are being constructed by means of individual or collective 
reflection. Morality is thus related to acquired norms, while ethics 
involves the construction of norms made necessary by ongoing changes 
(ibid.: 20-21). “Ethics has become the name of morality in the making” 
(ibid.: 22). A similar distinction is made by Monique Canto-Sperber and 
Ruwen Ogien (2006). In other terms, they are both the same substance, 
“the ethical substance” as Michel Foucault puts it (1984), at two different 
stages of its production/reproduction. 
Issues related to the links between Nature and Culture, between 
universalism and particularism, the relationship to the otherness, and so 
on, confirm that such concerns are shared. At the end of the day, ethical 
issues raised by moral philosophers appear to be the theoretical 
questioning of social anthropologists. As a matter of fact, both disciplines 
have become the target of a common social demand when it comes to 
tackling bioethical dilemmas, the universality of Human Rights, moral 
conflicts in situations where “cultures” coexist, and so on. 
The diversity of moralities thus constitutes one of the cornerstones 
of philosophy, just as anthropology claims that its epistemological 
foundations are diverse. Isaiah Berlin (1969) favours the notion of “moral 
pluralism,” and he champions the idea that there is no single value 
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system. The meaning given to ethics today bears a reference to Human 
Rights―rights that are assumed to be natural―in the same way as some 
essentialist assumptions of anthropology are meant to be universal. Such 
assumptions claim to make a distinction between cultural relativism and 
moral relativism in order to put the former on a pedestal in the name of a 
certain kind of ethics, while banning the latter from society. Are ethics 
natural? And are they universal? Clearly, these questions are issues for 
both moral philosophy and anthropology, as both disciplines operate 
within a vaguely defined scope in which there is tension between 
universalism and relativism.2 
However, unlike the moral philosopher, the anthropologist is 
uncomfortable suggesting the existence of a universal morality. Could we 
possibly go beyond the empirical observation that there is a variety of 
ethics in different places and eras, all equally valid, all being the 
expression and the outcome of human societies? Is it really the role of the 
anthropologist to assume the superiority or validity of one 
morality/ethics over another? How arbitrary is this assumption, which 
results from a surgical thinking process that restricts the contours of 
“Morality” and acts as a substratum unrelated to the context of a given 
culture? Isn’t this position the expression of a fear that, in the name of 
cultural relativism, one may conclude that “ethics do not exist” (Badiou 
2003: 53)? If such ethical questioning carries universalism at its very 
heart, it seems relevant to try and test this universality, which always 
appears relative to specific cases, in order to examine how ethics become 
specific to a particular cultural background or to a variety of fields of 
human activities within a certain cultural context (in Indonesia, in France, 
in India, in a grocery store, in a public company, in social work). 
Ethics, as understood today, are an exercise in “consensual 
legislation” for human beings, for their needs, their lives, their deaths, or 
for an obvious and universal definition of what is evil and what does not 
suit human nature (Badiou 2003: 25). For Kant, ethics are seen as the 
ability to distinguish Evil (for in the modern use of ethics, what is evil or 
negative comes first, thus implying a consensus of what is “barbarous,” 
and freedom of opinion means the freedom to identify Evil) (ibid.: 27-28). 
It is assumed that there exists one general human subject and that the evil 
that happens to them can be identified through universal criteria. “As 
ethics considers Evil to be inherently negative, it effectively refuses to 
address the singularity of a situation” (ibid.: 36). Good, in contrast, allows 
us to define evil, not the other way around (ibid.: 38). The main difficulty 
in ethics is to adapt a rule meant to be universal and unspecific―that is to 
say, a Law―to an individual’s behaviour. This difficulty of the dialectics 
                                                        
2 One of the factors that may explain the relative lack of interest in anthropological studies of 
morality by a generation of American anthropologists after World War II is the intense 
debate surrounding cultural relativism and universalism that took place within the American 
Anthropological Association following publication of the United Nations' Declaration of the 
Rights of Man in 1948. 




between universalism and particularism is also found in anthropology, 
which is probably more affected in its episteme than is moral philosophy. 
This constant oscillation between ethical thinking and anthropology is full 
of pitfalls and bias that the anthropologist must avoid for fear that he or 
she might become a moralist.  
Moreover, it is difficult to consider ethics as a universal category, 
even though it is based on universalist concerns, because it is also based 
on some form of culturalism (ibid.: 51). In the name of “universal” ethics, 
one should acknowledge and embrace this difference, while 
simultaneously ignoring it. As Badiou points out (ibid.: 39), “from the 
start, ethics are the ethics of others.” Ethics are the main opening to the 
other, they subordinate identity to difference. Ethics conquer distance in a 
way that could be summed up by saying: be like me and I shall respect 
your difference. The real question is therefore “recognizing the same” 
(ibid.: 49). Very few scholars have managed to solve this contradiction. 
Indeed, one may wonder if it is possible to address ethics, or the plurality 
of ethics, in an ethical way without falling into the pitfall of blind 
universalism, denying the difference of value systems associated with 
well-being or the pitfall of scientific cynicism that denies the universality 
of suffering―a moral truth of our times―in the name of intended scientific 
objectivity. Ethics, therefore, carries with it an inherent paradox: it tends 
to standardise behaviour on the basis of an ostensible universality, while 
representing a mere contradiction between tolerance and tensions of 
identity (ibid.: 44). If ethical questioning and anthropology have a 
common origin (the tension between universalism and singularity, the 
questioning of Man’s humanity when confronted with otherness), their 
paths―and, arguably, their destinations―are different. When 
anthropology deals with morality or ethics, it is not supposed to be in 
their applied form (Fassin 2008). 
For anthropologists, one solution may be to relinquish a fixed 
approach to ethics and morality in favour of a dynamic approach in which 
there is no “one size fits all” ethics, but “ethics in progress” (Badiou 2003: 
38), or, to repeat a phrase used above, ethics “in the making.” Rather than 
putting moral differences on trial, anthropologists should address and 
observe the process of morality―a process during which the individual or 
the collective deals with the possibilities of a situation, with the constraint 
of recollecting and reinterpreting what is transmitted (morality) in order 
to create (ethics). The multiplicity of processes by which ethics is 
produced should be addressed within a specific context. 
But how do the emergence and development of “business ethics” fit 
into these questions? Before establishing whether the anthropologist is 
confronted with an ethical or a moral issue, one should take a closer look 
at “business ethics” as a subject by placing it against its historical 
background and social uses. Is business ethics the daily construction of an 
ethical position, or is it a new language for the corporate world, reflecting 
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the rise of moral categories in today’s semantics and politics? Does the 
language of business ethics encompass the reality that it strives to show; 
that described by the philosophical discourse from which anthropologists 
draw their definition of ethics? This issue should not be addressed in 
normative but in pragmatic terms. Where is “business ethics” to be found 
in the production process? How does it address production itself? Where 
is business ethics found in production relations between workers and/or 
managers? How is it used in the company’s daily life? All these questions 
are possibilities for fruitful research in the field of the anthropology of 
entrepreneurial ethics, but this article is not intended to answer these 
questions definitively. Rather, let us review the history of the notion of an 
explicitly “business ethics.” 
 
Anthropology versus business ethics 
With its roots in the 1970s, business ethics emerged in the 1990s when 
companies started caring more about their social image while 
simultaneously trying to demonstrate that their efforts towards cost-
effectiveness were compatible with social or environmental justice and 
respect for individual rights. Business ethics then appeared in the field of 
applied ethics―the latter not being ethics as understood by moral 
philosophy, but a mere “guide.” All professions are underpinned by values 
and principles that can clash with ethics. In the corporate world, this 
“reflection” has led to the drawing up of charters and codes of conduct by 
which employees should abide. 
We could ask ourselves whether obeying these various codes of 
conduct and charters under managerial pressure within a company (to 
avoid redundancy, for example) has to do with the notion of “ethics” as 
understood by moral philosophy. For Kant, an act is moral when 
performed out of duty and pure respect for moral law. Unlike the sense of 
duty, it is an applied constraint. The expression “ethics committee,” 
describing a group of people in charge of safeguarding the application of 
ethics by scientists, soon sounds like an oxymoron. If ethics are codified, 
defined, or even imposed by an external governing body, hence becoming 
a constricted duty, are we still in the field of ethics? 
One of the main differences between business ethics and 
discussions of ethics and morality lies in the fact that such discussions are 
an attempt to solve moral conflicts, to define what is good or fair. 
Business ethics, however, does not deal with such principles. It belongs to 
the post-discussion phase, as if an original assumption has already been 
made, although no mention is made of how or by whom such decisions 
have been done so. In the light of this consensus, employees and 
customers must follow ethics as an order. Individuals must comply with 
moral imperatives without discussing them before or afterwards. 
Whereas customers can somehow take a stand on these notions of “good” 
and “fair” that underlie business ethics, by choosing one company over 




another, this is not the case for employees, who are caught up in a system 
in which they have no say. Does ethics not require, as theorists state, the 
independence of autonomous subjects and an examination of conscience? 
Is ethics under an employer’s authority still ethics? 
For Monique Canto-Sperber, the role of moral philosophy is to make 
sure that a debate on ethics does not just result in a series of rules or 
guidelines to be followed―which would amount to merely imposing 
moral standards―but in recommendations that have been discussed 
thoroughly and whose motives and conditions have been made clear 
(2012: 198). In a business, however, ethics are imposed from above. 
Working groups may be organised ahead of time, giving employees the 
illusion that they are part of the decision-making process. In this respect, 
business ethics is not the same as ethics as defined by moral philosophy. 
It seems relevant to emphasize the necessary distinction in 
anthropology between things pertaining to the professional ethics of the 
businessman and this category of “business ethics”―which probably makes 
more sense on the emic level. According to Monique Canto-Sperber and 
Ruwen Ogien (2006: 8), “professional morality can be seen as a concrete 
manifestation of the fact that professions […] go along with inherent 
values and principles.” Professional ethics is, therefore, the application of 
such morality by a given participant. The category of professional ethics 
applies to individuals immersed in the working world rather than to 
working collectives of large companies. 
Most of the “business ethics” literature is based on the idea that 
“ethics pays off” and that the expected rewards for a company’s good 
conduct will justify the money and staff invested in it. For Michela 
Marzano, “ethics is comparable to advertising: it sells and draws the 
public’s attention” (2008: 117). By spelling out its own rules, “an ethical 
company frees itself from both morality and politics. With its statements, 
charters and codes, it gradually places itself above any external body 
likely to decide on its responsibilities” (ibid.). 
Business ethics can be seen as legitimate but paradoxical because it 
suggests that business and ethics are incompatible. There is a confusion 
between the end and the means, along with a newfound difference 
between the ethics of economic life and the ethics of business enterprises. 
It stays only one step away from “cynical manipulation.” 
Anthropologists who carry out research in the workplace 
increasingly encounter similar conflicts in which codes of ethics are put 
forward in the production process, as well as in the collective 
organisation of work. What is called “business ethics” is now found 
everywhere. But how can it be conceived intellectually? What does this 
concept include? How can it be thought of in anthropological terms? 
Firstly, it can be established that, in the same way that the concept 
of “business ethics” seems incompatible with a philosophical acceptation, 
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it is not an anthropological category either. However, there are practices, 
codes and theories that anthropologists have a duty to question 
regardless of their purpose. There is a major difference between how this 
notion is used in practice, that is, in managerial discourse, and how it is 
used in philosophy and anthropology. For theorists and anthropologists, 
ethics is an intellectual exercise, a meaning-building process, a mode of 
producing moral subjects, or a research question. For the business world, 
however, ethics is an analytical and managerial tool, immutable and 
preconceived. It is therefore relevant to redefine “business ethics” as an 
empirical object and not as an intellectual notion, within the context of its 
own background and usage. However, to anthropologists, what is named 
“business ethics” by the actors can be studied in its emic sense, by 
describing how it is being used. 
As a matter of fact, the period that saw the field of business ethics 
emerge and develop has been identified as a “global turning point,” 
according to Caillé and Dufois (2013: 9). It was indeed in the 1970s that 
the idea of globalisation emerged and started to take hold. Can business 
ethics be interpreted as a response to the loss of normative bearings, 
disorganisation, a lack―or conversely, an excess―of meaning in a 
globalised world? Could the promotion of business ethics, or at least the 
social needs from which it arose, be an expression of a search for meaning 
in the context of a crisis of values? 
Moreover, there is something paradoxical about this increasing 
importance of ethics: while it aims at making people more responsible, it 
has the opposite effect in so far as it is ethical charters that now guide 
people’s thoughts and behaviour. Do such charters really promote 
autonomous thinking? Ethics can answer questions such as “How should I 
act?” But business ethics does not pose questions such as “What should 
one think?” It tells people “how they should think.” 
Can business ethics be considered as merely synonymous with―or 
an extension of―the much-talked-about corporate culture? If so, within a 
company, ethics would aim to negate differences between employees, 
thus imposing―while pretending to respect differences―a unified 
“corporate culture,” that is, identical behaviours. It appears legitimate to 
think that business ethics is a supporting tool for corporate culture within 
the context of organizational development. Business ethics is a framework 
of principles of intervention aimed at a planned organization of how 
companies function. 
Followers of business ethics, in the manner of those who promote 
the idea of “corporate culture,” consider ethics as well as culture as an 
asset, a resource that can be used to manage through symbols. However, 
it is within the context of negotiation that ethics are played out, and it is 
these conflicts of loyalty―between personal ethics and the organization’s 
ethical code―that can be a fruitful research object for the anthropologist. 
Such attempts to make sense of things in production units collide with the 




reality of the institution and the network of procedures and obligations in 
the business world. Along with an attempt to artificially create an idea of 
group cohesion through the notion of “corporate culture,” there is an 
attempt to instill the ideas of “well-being” and humane management at 
work. 
Is “business ethics” a way of avoiding “stress” at work? Does it 
really have the objective of applying morals to the production process, 
and is it capable of doing so? If so, it would be merely corporate culture. 
Consequently, ethics in the workplace would be relevant if the new reality 
of a business (as a network of production rather than as a physical unit of 
production) were taken into account and not reduced to the ethics of its 
employees or to the application of common standards of morality (Canto-
Sperber 2012: 120). Business ethics would then come into conflict with 
the “invisible hand” and freedom. 
Furthermore, it has become fashionable to consider a business as 
an entity that reflects values. Behind such practical approaches and 
slogans, there is a wealth of literature aimed at drawing businesses into a 
virtuous circle of “social performance.” As a result, the thin line between 
the end and the means becomes blurred because of newfound differences 
between the ethics of economic life and the ethics of the workplace. 
Business ethics is supposed to save businesses from the classic economic 
paradigm whereby the business world and the world of ethics were to be 
kept separate, in a kind of peaceful coexistence between profit and ethics. 
These benevolent intentions may well have originated from a will to free 
the business world of society’s moral judgements. 
 
Conclusion 
As I have here demonstrated, business ethics is a polysemic term. 
Anthropology has the right to use the notion of business ethics, but on the 
condition that it make a distinction between the empirical object and the 
philosophical notion of ethics. What we call “business ethics” fits into a 
corpus of technical and administrative procedures in business 
management that produces effects that are contrary to their own 
fundamental values. As business ethics attempts to create meaning, it 
comes up against the technicality of administrative and managerial 
procedures of the business world. 
The anthropology of “business ethics” requires that the concept be 
deconstructed and subsequently “anthropologized.” Having explained 
how anthropology is concerned with morality and ethics, it is relevant to 
wonder what anthropology could bring to the study of ethics in the 
specific context of business. “Business ethics”―like “corporate 
culture”―seems to be another avatar of the conceptual migration 
between the social sciences and philosophy, on the one hand, and the 
managerial line, on the other. 
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In order to be approached anthropologically, the notion of 
“business ethics” should be viewed separately from any consideration of 
its purpose, applicability, or even the question of the “real” or imagined 
intentions of participants using them for other purposes. In short, 
“business ethics” should be considered as a category of work 
management at the meeting point between theory and practice, in order 
to observe how this notion is used and disseminated in the daily life of a 
workplace. In other words, the discussion of, ethics should be freed from 
any attempt to apply its results and from normative debate. An easy 
solution would be to circumvent the question of “business ethics” in order 
to avoid the difficulty of talking about ethics without talking about ethics. 
However, not only is business ethics part of the daily life of the workplace, 
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